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 The minimum coverage provision does not re-
quire individuals to purchase any unique product or 
service but rather requires a standardized financial 
contribution to the national healthcare infrastructure 
from all legal residents who are able to pay – a kind 
of requirement that has never been found unduly or 
even unusually restrictive of individual liberty.  
 The question presented is whether the Eleventh 
Circuit erred in finding that the minimum coverage 
provision’s implications for individual liberty support 
a holding of constitutional invalidity under the Com-
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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The amici Jewish organizations represent a tra-
dition of believing that the community has an essen-
tial role in providing for the sick. Preserving life and 
health is one of the highest of communal duties in the 
Jewish tradition, taking precedence even over the con-
struction of a synagogue. These petitioners represent 
a minority community deeply committed to individual 
rights, including the right of privacy and the right 
of the individual to express choices of conscience in 
healthcare matters. Petitioners would oppose any sac-
rifice of genuinely fundamental individual rights in 
an effort to address the health care crisis.  
 The Jewish Alliance for Law and Social 
Action (JALSA) is a membership-based non-profit 
organization based in Boston working for social and 
economic justice, civil rights, and civil liberties for all 
peoples. Inspired by Jewish teachings and values, 
they have sought to achieve universal access and 
improvement of health outcomes through grassroots 
action, strategic coalition-building, and legislative 
initiatives. The organization was involved in the 
passage of the Massachusetts statute that served as a 
model for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA). 
 
 1 This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as 
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule 
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole 
or in part by counsel for any party. Amici have borne their own 
expenses, without support from any party. 
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 The Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (JCUA) 
combats poverty, racism and anti-Semitism in part-
nership with diverse communities in the Chicago area 
and beyond. Guided by prophetic Jewish principles, 
JCUA pursues social and economic justice for those 
who are most vulnerable by promoting a vision of em-
powering communities from within. Since its found-
ing in 1964, JCUA has assisted groups in low-income 
communities and communities of color, built coali-
tions with diverse groups, advocated on issues of 
human rights, poverty and racism, and mobilized a 
Jewish constituency to create a more just world for 
all. 
 The Jewish Social Policy Action Network 
(JSPAN) is a non-profit organization working out of 
Philadelphia dedicated to protecting the constitu-
tional and civil rights of minorities and the vulner-
able. JSPAN utilizes education, testimony, amicus 
curiae briefs and permissible grassroots organizing to 
support the separation of church and state, to ad-
vance individual rights under law, and generally to 
pursue tikkun olam, the “repair of the world.” JSPAN 
supports the availability of adequate healthcare, and 
health insurance in particular, to all Americans and 
has consistently supported the principles expressed in 
the ACA. 
 The New England Jewish Labor Committee 
(JLC) is the voice of the Jewish community in the 
labor movement and the voice of the labor movement 
in the Jewish community. By engaging the Jewish 
community in support of issues affecting working 
3 
people and the labor movement, the JLC enables the 
Jewish community and the trade union movement to 
work together on important issues of shared interest 
and concern, in pursuit of our shared commitment to 
economic and social justice. Access to universal, qual-
ity, affordable healthcare is seen as a critical social 
justice goal. 
 Professor Abigail R. Moncrieff is Peter Paul 
Career Development Professor and Associate Pro-
fessor of Law at Boston University School of Law, 
and she proudly joins these civil rights and civil 
liberties organizations as an amicus. Professor 
Moncrieff teaches and writes in the fields of health-
care law, federalism, and constitutional law, and she 
has written extensively on the liberty implications 
of the minimum coverage provision as well as on 
the federalism implications of the ACA. Professor 
Moncrieff therefore has a strong professional interest 
in the outcome of this case, as well as a personal 
pecuniary interest in the continuing security of the 
healthcare infrastructure. She joins this brief togeth-
er with her students, Zoë Sajor, Rachel Smit, and 
Emily Westfall, whom she thanks for their excellent 
research assistance. Professor Moncrieff ’s relevant 
scholarly works are available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=784767.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
   
4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 In its analysis of the minimum coverage provi-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit mischaracterized the stat-
ute’s implications for individual liberty, both in terms 
of the provision’s substantive intrusion on individual 
freedom and in terms of its structural incursion on 
state power to protect that freedom. As a result, the 
Court reached the wrong decision on the merits of the 
Article I challenge. 
 Although respondents do not argue that the so-
called “individual mandate” violates any protectable 
rights, they do argue – and the Eleventh Circuit held 
– that the provision’s implications for liberty support 
invalidation under the Commerce Clause and Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. The Eleventh Circuit correctly 
noted that, under this Court’s precedent, concerns 
about liberty often shape federalism doctrine. But the 
Court has emphasized such concerns only in a limited 
set of federalism cases: those in which the national 
government has exerted a kind of control that falls 
within the states’ traditional police power. 
 The individual mandate is not such a law. Con-
trary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assertions, the mini-
mum coverage provision does not require individuals 
to purchase any particular product. It is, instead, 
merely a requirement for individual financial par-
ticipation in the national healthcare infrastructure, 
much like a tax. The provision is thus a kind of 
regulatory control that does not, under this Court’s 
precedent, raise rights-based concerns. 
5 
 Furthermore, although the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) certainly increases the 
federal government’s involvement in insurance reg-
ulation, the statute preserves significant state au-
thority over both health insurance and healthcare. 
Beyond the federally-mandated financial contribu-
tion, individuals remain free to choose among many 
insurance products for structuring their healthcare 
payments and free to choose whatever courses of 
medical treatment they prefer, subject almost entirely 
to state rather than federal definition. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MISCHARAC-
TERIZED THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PRO-
VISION’S IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL 
LIBERTY. 
  In holding that the minimum coverage provision 
(“provision” or “individual mandate”), 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A, of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(ACA),2 is unconstitutional under Article I, see U.S. 
Const. art I., § 8, the Eleventh Circuit hinged its 
analysis on the provision’s implications for individual 
liberty. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284, 1291-92 
 
 2 Amended by the Health Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
6 
(11th Cir. 2011) (noting at the outset that the “ulti-
mate goal” of “structural constitutional limitations” is 
“the protection of individual liberty” and that the 
mandate’s perceived intrusion on freedom “strikes at 
the very heart of whether Congress has acted within 
its enumerated power”). 
 Although the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted 
that one purpose of our government’s federal struc-
ture is to protect freedom, the majority opinion made 
a critical error that led it to the wrong result on the 
merits: It misunderstood the basic nature and func-
tion of the minimum coverage provision. When prop-
erly characterized as a requirement for individual 
financial contribution to the national healthcare in-
frastructure rather than as a requirement for indi-
vidual purchase of a unique product or individual 
consumption of a given commodity, the provision 
poses neither a threat to liberty nor a threat to feder-
alism. 
 As civil rights and civil liberties organizations 
dedicated to improving access to high quality health-
care, amici are interested in both the protection of 
liberty from government and the facilitation of liberty 
through government. The federal structure serves 
both purposes, and it is vital that all units of govern-
ment – Congress, the Executive, and this Court alike 
– strike an appropriate balance between limiting 
intervention and respecting regulation. With the ACA, 
Congress wrote a well-balanced law that supports 
a high quality healthcare infrastructure without 
7 
unduly restricting states’ or individuals’ power to 
satisfy their needs and preferences. 
 
A. Although Liberty is a Legitimate Con-
cern in Federalism Analysis, the Liberty 
Interests that Have Been Relevant in 
this Context Are Those that Relate to 
the Core Police Power of the States. 
 A general principle of individual freedom un-
doubtedly underlies our government’s federal struc-
ture. In part, federalism serves simply to slow down 
regulatory decisionmaking, to make restrictive inter-
ventions harder to pass. More importantly, though, 
federalism serves to place the most intrusive forms of 
regulatory power into the hands of smaller govern-
ments so that individuals are better represented in 
the regulatory processes that lead to their forfeitures 
of freedom, particularly their imprisonment. See 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) 
(noting that state governments allow individuals to 
make their voices heard “without having to rely solely 
upon the political processes that control a remote 
central power”). 
 In keeping with the latter point, this Court has 
stressed the importance of federalism to liberty only 
when the national government has exerted a kind of 
control that belongs with the states’ police power: 
regulations related to education, public health, 
and public safety. Indeed, all Supreme Court cases 
that have noted the interrelationship of liberty and 
8 
federalism have involved federal attempts to regulate 
public safety. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (criminal 
chemical weapons ban); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (private right of action for victims 
of domestic violence); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997) (background checks for gun sales); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criminal prohibi-
tion on firearm possession near schools); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regulation of 
nuclear waste disposal); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452 (1991) (interpreting a federal statute to 
preserve a state public health regulation: a manda-
tory retirement age for state judges). 
 By contrast, this Court does not emphasize lib-
ertarian3 implications in federalism cases that center 
on purely financial regulations, such as taxes or other 
kinds of mandatory contributions, even when those 
financial regulations intend to affect individual be-
havior. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 
(1987), for example, the Court confronted the view 
that the federal government’s effective taxation of 
states for refusing to change the drinking age raised 
concerns about state freedom, and it squarely rejected 
the argument. The Court noted that constitutional 
limits have always relied on “ ‘a robust common sense 
which assumes the freedom of the will [to reject mere 
 
 3 Throughout this brief, we use “libertarian” in its small-l 
sense, to mean “related to liberty.” We do not mean to refer to 
the Libertarian Party or to the broader political movement that 
has now come to be associated with the Tea Party. 
9 
financial incentives] as a working hypothesis.’ ” Id. 
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
590 (1937)). 
 In short, the virtues of the states as subunits of 
government, providing citizens with greater opportu-
nities of voice, diversity, and exit than they have at 
the national level, are important to individual free-
dom when the regulation at issue is truly coercive – 
when it is one that has historically fallen within the 
states’ police power. Financial regulations are capable 
of raising the same kinds of libertarian concerns only 
if they reach a magnitude of intervention at which 
“ ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Dole, 483 U.S. at 
211 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590). But 
universal obligations for financial participation that 
are well-calibrated and minimally intrusive, like 
ordinary taxes, have never been thought to raise 
libertarian concerns or to require state control. The 
Eleventh Circuit’s apparent holding to the contrary 
constitutes a dramatic departure from this Court’s 
longstanding and consistent precedent. 
 
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision is a 
Well-Calibrated and Non-Coercive Re-
quirement for Financial Participation 
in the National Healthcare Infrastruc-
ture, Which Does Not Implicate State 
Police Power. 
 Given the role that liberty has played in federal-
ism cases, the respondents would need to estab- 
lish that the minimum coverage provision either is 
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non-financial or is truly coercive in order to establish 
that libertarian concerns can justify their narrow 
reading of Article I. But the mandate is, in fact, 
purely financial and not at all coercive. 
 Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit’s and the 
respondents’ insistence to the contrary, the individual 
mandate does not require individuals to buy any 
particular product or service. Instead, it merely 
requires legal residents of the United States to con-
tribute some money to the national healthcare infra-
structure, either by paying into a private insurance 
pool of the individual’s choice or by making an equiv-
alent or lesser “shared responsibility payment” to the 
national treasury. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b); § 5000A(c)(1) 
(capping possible penalties at the cost of an average 
private plan). Importantly, the maximum amount 
that the mandate requires any individual to pay is 
the average cost of the least-comprehensive level of 
private insurance coverage, § 5000A(c)(1)(B), mean-
ing that individuals are not financially penalized for 
choosing to give their money to the federal fisc in-
stead of giving it to private insurance. The only thing 
that self-insured individuals forfeit by choosing a 
shared responsibility payment over an insurance 
contract is the private insurance coverage, but that 
forfeiture is not a penalty at all for individuals like 
the respondents, who prefer to remain self-insured, 
see Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270-71 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011) (describing the allegations of two plaintiffs 
who claim to prefer self-insurance), aff ’d in part, 
11 
rev’d in part sub nom. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235. Given 
the magnitude of the penalty and its statutory cali-
bration to private insurance premiums, the minimum 
coverage provision requires nothing more or less than 
a universal, standardized contribution to the health-
care infrastructure from all legal residents who are 
able to pay.4 
 In this sense, the individual mandate is, as far as 
its effect on liberty is concerned, indistinguishable 
from an ordinary tax.5 Although the mandate func-
tions slightly differently from ordinary taxes – as 
we will discuss shortly – its effects on individual 
liberty are fundamentally the same. Indeed, Congress 
was aware that the mandate resembles a tax for 
liberty purposes; the provision contains a religious 
exemption that simply cross-references the Internal 
 
 4 The mandate excuses from this financial contribution 
legal residents who have public healthcare through the Military 
Health System (TRICARE) and Veterans Affairs. See 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(f)(1)(A)(iv)-(v). Those individuals, though, have earned 
their public benefit through their service and have supported 
the national infrastructure in other ways. Others are excused 
from the contribution only if they are unable to pay, like Medi-
caid enrollees, § 5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii), if they have paid into the 
system through prior taxation, like Medicare enrollees, 
§ 5000A(f)(1)(A)(i), or if they fall into limited statutory exemp-
tions, § 5000A(e). 
 5 This brief does not argue that the individual mandate is a 
tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act or the Article I taxing 
power. The point here is only that the mandate’s imposition on 
liberty is no greater or lesser than that of a standard tax, which 
would be true even if the mandate constituted a commercial 
regulation rather than a tax. 
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Revenue Code’s general religious exemption for self-
employed individuals. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2) 
(cross-referencing 26 U.S.C.A. § 1402(g)(1)). The 
religious exemption, thus, relates only to financial 
contribution, not to enrollment in health insurance, 
because financial contribution is all that the mandate 
ultimately requires. 
 The federal government compels residents to con-
tribute to countless national infrastructures on which 
they might or might not individually rely, including 
the military, highway, telecommunications, ecological, 
agricultural, and energy infrastructures, among many 
others, and the individual mandate simply adds the 
healthcare infrastructure to that list. Cf. Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that the man-
date is no more intrusive than the many tax laws 
requiring individuals to “spend money on things they 
may not need”), petition for cert. pending, No.11-117 
(filed July 26, 2011). 
 Of course, there is an obvious arguable distinc-
tion between the individual mandate and ordinary 
taxation (at least as taxation is commonly perceived): 
The minimum coverage provision relies on private 
entities to maintain the healthcare infrastructure 
rather than relying on public entities like the United 
States military. It is this difference more than any 
other that seemingly motivated the Eleventh Cir- 
cuit to decry the individual mandate as a “novel” 
attempt to “compel” individuals “to enter the stream 
of commerce.” See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1291-92 
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(“Individuals subjected to this economic mandate 
have not made a voluntary choice to enter the stream 
of commerce, but instead are having that choice im-
posed upon them by the federal government.”); id. at 
1328 (“This economic mandate represents a wholly 
novel and potentially unbounded assertion of con-
gressional authority: the ability to compel Americans 
to buy an expensive health insurance product they 
have elected not to buy. . . .”). 
 But this arguable distinction is a false one. Many 
of our most important national infrastructures rely 
on private contractors for their primary support. 
Private utility companies are responsible for many 
states’ energy infrastructures; private construction 
contractors maintain the highway and transporta- 
tion infrastructures; private telephone and internet 
providers own the telecommunications infrastruc- 
ture; private environmental consultants safeguard 
the ecological infrastructure; private farmers own 
the agricultural infrastructure. And even the military 
sometimes relies on private contractors to support its 
efforts, as the public learned in the Blackwater 
Security scandal, see Associated Press, U.S. Embassy 
Resumes Use of Blackwater Security, U.S.A. Today, 
Sept. 21, 2007. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367 
(2003) (discussing governmental reliance on private 
contractors and its implications for structural consti-
tutional limits). General tax dollars, collected com-
pulsorily from all Americans, support these private 
companies without raising liberty-based constitutional 
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concerns – without provoking accusations that these 
programs force unwilling Americans “to enter the 
stream of commerce.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1292. 
 Importantly, the federal Medicare program also 
relies on private insurance companies, called “Medi-
care Administrative Contractors,” to manage the part 
of the healthcare infrastructure that serves the 
elderly and disabled populations. See Ctrs. for Medi-
care & Medicaid Servs., Part A/Part B Medicare 
Administrative Contractor (Sept. 21, 2011). Under 
Medicare, the government forcibly collects tax dollars 
from all individuals working in the United States 
and uses those dollars to pay private health insur-
ance companies to administer enrollees’ benefits. This 
point might help to explain why a protester infamously 
commanded Representative Robert Inglis to “keep 
your government hands off my Medicare,” Phillip 
Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C. Is Voice of Opposition 
to Health-Care Reform, Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, at 
A1 (“At a recent town-hall meeting in suburban 
Simpsonville[, S.C.], a man stood up and told Rep. 
Robert Inglis (R-S.C.) to ‘keep your government 
hands off my Medicare.’ ”), but it raises the question 
of why such protesters do not, either when paying 
Medicare payroll taxes or when enrolling in the man-
datory Medicare Part A program for hospitalization 
benefits, complain that they are being forced to “enter 
the stream of commerce.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1292. 
 The difference might be that, when paying Med- 
icare taxes, the money goes first to the federal 
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government and only later to the Medicare Admin- 
istrative Contractor, making the Medicare payments 
more obviously taxation. The minimum coverage 
provision, by contrast, cuts out the middle man of the 
federal government for those individuals who choose 
private insurance contracts over shared responsibility 
payments, effectively enlisting a network of private 
contracts as a public program. But that strategy for 
a public infrastructure is far from novel. 
 Even during the height of the Lochner era, see 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), this Court 
recognized that some private industries were so “im-
pressed with a public interest” that they were essen-
tially public in nature – sufficiently so that they could 
be rate-regulated despite the then-robust freedom of 
contract doctrine. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 
261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 113 (1876)), overruled in part by West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The para-
digmatic example of such quasi-public entities is the 
common carrier – railroads, airlines, and the like – 
but the public interest exception to the freedom of 
contract also extended to bakers, warehouses, inn-
keepers, and many others. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 125 
(“[I]t has been customary in England from time im-
memorial, and in this country from its first coloniza-
tion, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, 
bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in 
so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for 
services rendered, accommodations furnished, and 
articles sold.”).  
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 Crucially for present purposes, the same excep-
tion applied to insurers. See O’Gorman & Young, Inc. 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931) 
(holding that “[t]he business of insurance is so far 
affected with a public interest that the State may 
regulate the rates” (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. 
Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914))). In fact, the Lochner-
era Supreme Court explicitly analogized private 
insurance to taxation, reasoning: 
The effect of insurance – indeed, it has been 
said to be its fundamental object – is to dis-
tribute the loss over as wide an area as pos-
sible. In other words, the loss is spread over 
the country, the disaster to an individual is 
shared by many, the disaster to a community 
shared by other communities. . . . In assimi-
lation of insurance to a tax, the companies 
have been said to be the mere machinery by 
which the inevitable losses by fire are dis-
tributed so as to fall as lightly as possible on 
the public at large, the body of the insured, 
not the companies, paying the tax. 
German Alliance, 233 U.S. at 412-13. This Court thus 
has a long history of treating private insurance as a 
quasi-public infrastructure, closely analogous to a 
system of collective taxation, and the Court has 
therefore allowed insurance to be subject to intensive 
regulation even in the face of once-robust substantive 
restrictions. 
 Indeed, several states passed the first compul-
sory insurance provisions for workers’ compensation 
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and automobile insurance during the same era. Per-
haps because this Court had established that insur-
ance was quasi-public, freedom of contract challenges 
to these provisions gained no traction. See Alaska 
Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 
532, 541-43 (1935) (noting that a California court had 
characterized the state’s workers’ compensation re-
gime as “compulsory insurance” but upholding the 
regime against a freedom of contract challenge on the 
ground that it merely assigned liabilities); see also In 
re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566 (1925) (consid-
ering possible constitutional infirmities with a pro-
posed compulsory auto insurance law in an advisory 
opinion to the New Hampshire legislature and raising 
only equal protection and dormant commerce clause 
issues, not freedom of contract issues). Even at the 
height of the Lochner era, then, compulsory insurance 
provisions did not raise libertarian concerns. 
 Of course, the Lochner-era Court’s special treat-
ment of insurance – and its analogizing of insurance 
to taxation – makes tremendous sense. Not only do 
insurance pools and tax funds play similar roles of 
risk-spreading and cost-sharing, but also, when free-
riders and other market failures cause insurance 
pools to fail, taxpayers inevitably fill the gap. A 
property destroyed by fire that cannot be rebuilt must 
be condemned; a non-functioning automobile on the 
highway that cannot be towed must be cleared; and a 
family left behind after death that cannot self-sustain 
must be supported. Similarly, because we have de-
cided as a matter of policy that all Americans with 
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emergent medical conditions must be treated, see 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, taxpayers frequently fill expen-
sive gaps when the self-insured are unable to pay, see 
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (finding that uncompen-
sated care cost $43 billion in 2008). In the end, as the 
Lochner Court seemed to understand, requiring in-
dividuals to choose between paying into an insurance 
pool or contributing an equal or lesser sum to the 
national treasury does not actually change their base-
line state of freedom. Taxpayers are already paying 
for systemic healthcare costs through the less-
efficient public safety net. 
 The longstanding analogy between insurance and 
taxation also helps to refute the slippery slope argu-
ments that have arisen in this litigation, including 
the District Court’s fear that a finding of constitu-
tionality might allow Congress to require purchases 
of anything from broccoli to automobiles. See Florida, 
780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. An important distinguishing 
feature of insurance is that it is merely a fiscal pool, 
available to protect against economic loss. Unlike a 
compelled purchase of broccoli or cars, a mandatory 
contribution to an insurance pool does not require the 
regulated individual to devote any of her time or 
space to keeping, selling, or destroying any physical 
object. The imposition on her liberty is thus extremely 
small and, again, purely financial. The appropriate 
analogy to food markets, then, is not to a broccoli 
mandate but rather to farm subsidies, which force all 
taxpayers to buy into the agricultural infrastructure 
19 
whether or not they consume the supported products. 
And those subsidies can be just as influential on 
consumption choices as the minimum coverage provi-
sion ever could be; the subsidies for domestic corn 
(combined with tariffs on imported sugar) have long 
“compel[led],” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1328, Americans to 
buy corn syrup instead of sugar. See Tim Worstall, 
Big Corn’s HFCS v. Big Sugar’s Sucrose: Maybe Both 
Could Lose?, Forbes.com (Dec. 26, 2011). 
 The Eleventh Circuit and the respondents posit a 
second distinction between the minimum coverage 
provision and other quasi-public infrastructures: 
Private individuals during the Lochner era were not 
required to give their money to the quasi-public 
entities, like insurance companies, unless they were 
likely to use or were in fact using the entities’ ser-
vices. Car insurance was obligatory only for drivers; 
workers’ compensation funds were obligatory only for 
employers; and payments to common carriers, bakers, 
warehousemen, and grain elevators were obligatory 
only for users. The individual mandate, by contrast, 
applies to all legal residents of the United States, 
regardless of whether they are using or ever will use 
the healthcare system. See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1290-
91. 
 The most that can be said of this distinction, 
though, is that it makes the ACA’s statutory scheme 
slightly more analogous to mandatory taxation than 
the Lochner-era schemes were. There is simply noth-
ing in this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence or in 
the text of the Constitution itself that obligates 
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regulators to choose user fees over collective contribu-
tions to support public or quasi-public infrastruc-
tures. So long as the infrastructure in question is a 
proper subject of federal regulation and the magni-
tude of the compelled fee is reasonable, Congress may 
choose any regulatory approach it likes. Furthermore, 
it makes sense for Congress to choose collective con-
tributions over user fees when all Americans are 
extremely likely to benefit from the supported infra-
structure at some point and when payments are 
difficult to collect from users at the point of service. 
National defense is the classic example of an infra-
structure with these characteristics, and healthcare 
is similar, particularly given individuals’ failures to 
save sufficiently for needed care. See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 18091(a)(2)(F)-(G) (finding that individuals con-
sumed $43 billion of uncompensated care in 2008 and 
that such unsaved-for consumption contributes to 62 
percent of personal bankruptcies). 
 In short, there is nothing in the least bit novel 
about relying on private insurance as a quasi-public 
infrastructure, nor is there anything novel about 
setting rates for and requiring contributions to pri-
vate insurers in order to fund that infrastructure. 
This approach to collective maintenance of pub- 
lic goods has an established history in the United 
States, and it is a regulatory approach that has long 
been thought to respect even the most stringent 
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substantive libertarian constraints.6 Furthermore, it 
is an approach that is, as this Court has long ac-
knowledged, closely analogous to the standard federal 
function of distributing the costs of national public 
goods through taxation.7 
 Of course, the individual mandate has aroused 
considerable public backlash (further bolstering the 
analogy to taxation!) because many Americans are 
uncomfortable with the perceived requirement that 
they enter a private contract. Also, the mandate is 
obviously somewhat intrusive of individual freedom 
insofar as it directs Americans’ use of their money. 
 
 6 This approach fell out of favor during the New Deal era, 
as the federal government began to replace quasi-public in-
dustry with purely public programs like Social Security. It is 
therefore understandable that the regulatory strategy appears 
novel to today’s respondents. With the modern push towards pri-
vatization and deregulation, however, this approach to support-
ing public infrastructures might well become more common. The 
important point, though, is that quasi-public strategies for 
public infrastructures do not now raise nor have they ever raised 
implications for individual liberty beyond the generalized re-
straints that come with all taxation and regulation. 
 7 Although the Lochner-era Supreme Court treated insur-
ance as a local business that could not be subject to national 
regulation, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), the 
Court has since reversed that holding, see United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). It is now 
well established that the business of insurance crosses state 
lines and therefore falls within Congress’s authority to regulate 
interstate commerce. Indeed, the respondents do not allege that 
Congress lacks authority to regulate health insurers directly; 
they have not challenged the many insurance regulations in the 
ACA. 
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But “[n]ot every intrusive law is an unconstitution-
ally intrusive law.” Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 565 
(Sutton, J., concurring). The individual mandate 
presents no greater threat to liberty than any ordi-
nary requirement to pay for the support of our na-
tion’s infrastructures. 
 
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Fully 
Respects and Preserves Individuals’ 
Healthcare Autonomy. 
 One true distinction between the individual man-
date and other quasi-public infrastructures is that 
the minimum coverage provision regulates health, 
which is a regime that has been dedicated to states’ 
police power, see Florida, 648 F.3d at 1306, as well 
as a regime that has received special solicitude in 
modern substantive due process jurisprudence, see 
Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2209 (2011). Ultimately, however, this 
distinction makes no difference. The mandate does 
not attempt to influence public health regulation (the 
subject that has been state or local) or medical de-
cisionmaking (the subject that receives heightened 
substantive protection). The mandate regulates only 
healthcare financing. 
 In the mythology that has arisen around this 
case, many commentators have analogized the mini-
mum coverage provision to a requirement that indi-
viduals buy broccoli, see generally Einer Elhauge, 
Op-Ed., The Broccoli Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2011, 
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at A35 (noting the prevalence of the broccoli analogy); 
Einer Elhauge, The Irrelevance of the Broccoli Argu-
ment Against the Individual Mandate, 366 New Eng. 
J. Med. e1 (2012) (arguing that the analogy ultimately 
fails), while others, including the District Court 
below, have also analogized the mandate to a re-
quirement that individuals eat broccoli, Florida, 780 
F. Supp. 2d at 1289. As discussed above, it is not at all 
clear that the provision compels any purchase at all 
because individuals can comply by making an equal 
or lesser financial contribution to government; and 
even if the provision did require a purchase, the 
analogy to broccoli would fail because the mandate 
includes no obligation to take ownership or posses-
sion of a physical object. Regardless, though, it is be-
yond cavil that the mandate does not require 
consumption of any particular medical care. In other 
words, the mandate does not, in fact, require anyone 
to eat his broccoli. The minimum coverage provision, 
at most, requires individuals to be insured against 
certain kinds of sickness and accidents. It does not 
require individuals to seek healthcare when they 
become sick or have an accident. 
 The individual mandate, therefore, does nothing 
to regulate individuals’ autonomous medical decis- 
ions nor anything to regulate public health inputs 
or outcomes, nor does it in any way infringe on an 
individual’s freedom to reject unwanted medical in-
terventions. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 
221-22 (1990) (noting that individuals have “a signif-
icant liberty interest . . . under the Due Process 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” in rejecting 
unwanted medical intervention). The provision is 
simply a requirement that all capable individuals 
contribute financially to the nation’s healthcare 
infrastructure.  
 Again, the appropriate analogy to food markets is 
not to a purchase mandate for broccoli but rather to 
the mandatory contributions that all taxpayers make 
to the agricultural infrastructure through farm sub-
sidies. Those subsidies flow from taxpayers to private 
farmers, not public programs; they are compulsory for 
all taxpaying residents; and although they alter the 
overall balance of the food supply (in favor of corn 
syrup over sugar, for example), the subsidies leave 
Americans free to choose what they eat. The only 
functional difference between the minimum coverage 
provision and farm subsidies is that the mandate 
channels financial support directly from taxpayers to 
private insurers instead of involving the national 
government as a middle man subsidizer. In the end, 
just as farm subsidies leave Americans free to eat 
whatever they choose, the insurance mandate leaves 
Americans free to pursue any course of medical 
treatment they choose. 
 It ought also to be relevant to healthcare auton-
omy that the individual mandate will increase many 
Americans’ access to healthcare, improving rather 
than harming their freedom to obtain medical inter-
ventions. By mandating universal financial support 
for the healthcare infrastructure, the mandate en-
sures that high quality medical care will always be 
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available in the United States. In this sense, too, the 
mandate functions like farm subsidies, which have 
long been thought necessary to ensure that the food 
supply is sufficient to sustain Americans’ freedom to 
access adequate nutrition. Because both food and 
healthcare are basic human needs, regulations that 
improve access to and quality of those goods (without 
restricting consumption choices) ought to be under-
stood as fundamentally freedom-enhancing. Further-
more, because purchasing insurance coverage will 
constitute compliance with the mandate, many indi-
viduals will choose to gain easy financial access to 
healthcare by entering an insurance contract, rather 
than choosing to continue their reliance on often-
faulty self-insurance by making a shared responsibil-
ity payment. Those individuals will gain significantly 
greater capacity to obtain healthcare, even though 
they will remain free to reject any healthcare they 
don’t want. From the perspective of medical liberty 
and healthcare autonomy, thus, the individual man-
date improves the baseline state of freedom for the 
currently insured and the currently uninsured alike. 
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II. FOR THOSE WHO CHOOSE TO COMPLY 
BY PURCHASING INSURANCE, THE ACA 
LEAVES THE CONTENTS OF THEIR PUR-
CHASE PRIMARILY TO STATE CONTROL, 
PRESERVING STATE POWER OVER THE 
ASPECTS OF THE MANDATE THAT MAT-
TER MOST TO LIBERTY. 
 Although the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted 
that both the insurance and healthcare industries fall 
“within the sphere of traditional state regulation,” 
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1305, the majority opinion gross-
ly exaggerated the minimum coverage provision’s 
departure from that traditional baseline. Indeed, the 
opinion merely asserted, without citation or elabo-
ration, “that the individual mandate supersedes a 
multitude of the states’ policy choices in these key 
areas of traditional state concern.” Id. at 1306. 
 Of course, the mandate itself does no such thing. 
Whether viewed as a standardized contribution to the 
healthcare infrastructure or as a purchase mandate 
for an insurance product, the individual mandate 
itself, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a), says nothing at all 
about the nature of the insurance at issue, much less 
about the nature of the medical care that such insur-
ance will cover, cf. § 5000A(f) (defining “minimum es-
sential coverage” broadly to include any legal, com-
prehensive health insurance product). It is instead 
the ACA’s other insurance regulations, including the 
definition of “essential health benefits” found else-
where in the statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022, that regu-
late the insurance products one can buy in complying 
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with the mandate. But the respondents do not allege 
here or anywhere else that those insurance regula-
tions exceed Congress’s Article I powers. Indeed, 
under this Court’s holding in South-Eastern Under-
writers, 322 U.S. 533, Congress has clear authority to 
regulate the contents and practices of any insurance 
contract bought or sold in the United States. It is only 
the supposed additional requirement that legal res-
idents enter such contracts that is in dispute here. 
 That said, the ACA’s overall regulatory approach 
to health insurance and healthcare is, in one sense, 
relevant to the mandate’s implications for individual 
liberty: The greater the range of options available to 
individuals and states for complying with the man-
date, the less concerned this Court needs to be that 
the mandate represents a coercive exercise of a fed-
eral police power. Cf. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1309 (wor-
rying that a finding of constitutional validity would 
“vest Congress with a general police power”). It is 
thus highly relevant that the ACA, notwithstanding 
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusory assertion to the 
contrary, preserves significant state authority over 
both insurance and care. Because states have author-
ity to diversify in regulating the contents of insurance 
contracts, individuals could have essentially limitless 
options for compliance with the mandate. 
 State diversification is possible through two ave-
nues. First, the ACA preserves state authority over 
the aspects of public health and healthcare regulation 
that historically have been delegated to states’ police 
power – a point that cuts in favor of constitutionality 
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under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1958-61 (2010) 
(stressing the importance to Necessary and Proper 
Clause analysis of the statute’s degree of departure 
from traditional areas of federal concern), and that 
eviscerates the Eleventh Circuit’s fear of a national 
police power. Second, the ACA provides the states 
with many opportunities for asserting their citizens’ 
interests through national political and administra-
tive processes, providing additional prospects for 
interstate diversification through the ACA regulatory 
structure as well as providing further support for 
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, see id. at 1962-63 (noting that a statute is 
more likely to be constitutional if it “accounts for 
state interests”). 
 
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Pre-
serves the States’ Historic Police Power 
in the Regimes that are Most Important 
to Individual Liberty. 
 The Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that health-
care and insurance regulation traditionally fall with-
in the police power of the states. But not all statutes 
that relate to healthcare or insurance implicate that 
power, as should be apparent from the multitude of 
federal healthcare and health insurance regulations 
already on the books. See, e.g., Women’s Health and 
Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 902, 
112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Health 
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 101 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C.); Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); Old-Age, Survi-
vors, and Disability Insurance Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in 
42 U.S.C.) (establishing Medicare); Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 
717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in 21 
U.S.C.). The states’ police power, then, has been and 
ought to be limited to those exercises of regulatory 
power that truly coerce individuals. Although the 
ACA sets a federal floor for some insurance regula-
tions, the statute preserves the nearly exclusive state 
authority over medical regulation (such as licensure, 
vaccination, and quarantine), and it preserves signifi-
cant state authority over insurance regulation, in-
cluding the core state power to license insurers. 
 
1. States retain their nearly exclusive 
authority over regulation of medicine. 
 Although it is well established that the power to 
regulate healthcare and public health traditionally 
rests with the states, that tradition does not encom-
pass all regulations related to healthcare. The tradi-
tion historically covers only true medical regulation, 
such as licensure of doctors and hospitals, and true 
public health regulation, such as mandatory vacci-
nation and quarantine. Indeed, the cases that the 
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Eleventh Circuit cited in asserting the police power 
over healthcare – and the cases in which this Court 
has emphasized that state power – relate to one of 
those two regulatory regimes. The relevant cases con-
cern regulations that seek to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of medical interventions and regulations that 
seek to prevent the spread of disease. See Florida, 
648 F.3d at 1305 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243 (2006) (safety and efficacy of physician-assisted 
suicide); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (safety 
of abortion clinics); Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560 (1991) (clothing mandates for exotic danc-
ers); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 
U.S. 424 (1963) (safety of optometrists through licen-
sure regulations); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 
442 (1954) (safety of physicians through licensure 
regulations); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905) (mandatory vaccination)); Florida, 648 F.3d at 
1306 (citing Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (safety of blood dona-
tion), as well as insurance cases not relevant in this 
subsection); see also Oregon-Washington R.R. & 
Navigation v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 93-96 (1926) 
(noting that state police power includes quarantine, 
notwithstanding impact on interstate commerce, un-
less Congress has exercised conflicting control by 
statute). 
 Both of those categories of power – both medical 
regulation and public health regulation – remain 
untouched under the ACA. The statute says noth- 
ing about disease control; it leaves the licensure of 
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hospitals, doctors, and other medical practitioners 
entirely to the states; and it does nothing to shift 
safety and quality regulations to the federal govern-
ment beyond the shift accomplished long ago in the 
FDCA. Although the ACA does create a grant pro-
gram to encourage state experimentation with alter-
native medical malpractice regimes, the states are 
free to refuse those grants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15. 
Overall, the ACA requires no change in state regula-
tions of medical care. 
 The core police power over healthcare, thus, re-
mains entirely intact. All of medical regulation re-
mains as much in state hands as it was before the 
ACA. States therefore remain primarily in charge of 
an individual’s freedom to obtain or to reject medical 
treatments – the aspects of healthcare regulation 
that potentially implicate modern substantive due 
process. See generally Moncrieff, supra. Once indi-
viduals buy insurance policies to comply with the 
federal mandate, their access to and interactions with 
medical care will be subject to state rather than fed-
eral oversight, just as they always have been. As a 
result, if an individual dislikes her state’s medical 
regulatory regime, she will be free to move to a differ-
ent state with a different approach, and she will also 
be free to appeal to her smaller state government for 
policy change. The benefits of federalism to medical 
freedom, thus, are entirely untouched by the ACA and 
its individual mandate. 
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2. States retain significant authority 
over insurance regulation. 
 The ACA obviously does more to regulate insur-
ance than medical care, but the statute nevertheless 
preserves significant state authority over insurance 
practice. Indeed, the states retain primary authority 
to define the range of products available to their 
citizens for complying with the individual mandate. 
 Most importantly, the ACA does nothing to dis-
rupt the longstanding state power over insurance 
licensure. See Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine 
J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the Tensions 
of Federalism, 362 New Eng. J. Med. 2244, 2245 
(2010) (noting that states will continue licensing in-
surers). Under the ACA, a state may refuse to allow 
any given insurance company to write and sell poli-
cies within its borders. The states thus possess – and 
retain after the ACA – an absolute power of exclusion 
that they can use to control the health insurance 
products available to their citizens. The ACA obvi-
ously imposes some new limits on the contents and 
practices of insurance policies, as we discuss below, 
but the states retain an important power to exclude 
from their markets any insurance company or prod-
uct that the state or its citizens dislike. Moreover, 
after extensive state lobbying during the passage of 
the ACA, Congress opted not to repeal the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006), which 
continues to exempt insurance from federal antitrust 
regulations. See Jonathan Dinan, Shaping Health 
Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 Publius 395, 
399, 412-13 (2011). Any state that chooses to do 
so, therefore, may create an insurance monopoly or 
oligopoly within its borders without fear of federal 
intervention. 
 Of course, the ACA includes a new requirement 
that licensed insurance products be available for pur-
chase through “American Health Benefit Exchanges,” 
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031, but it leaves the states with 
tremendous flexibility in designing and governing 
those exchanges. See generally Jon Kingsdale & John 
Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform: 
Six Design Issues for the States, 29 Health Aff. 1158 
(2010). Indeed, the most fundamental choices about 
exchange design are up to state discretion. States can 
choose among a state-specific exchange, a federal 
exchange, and a multi-state regional exchange, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 18031(f), 18041(c); they may establish 
multiple exchanges within their borders, § 18031(f); 
and they may decide whether or not to allow large 
group insurers to sell policies through the exchange, 
§ 18032(f)(2). In short, just as the range of products is 
left to states to determine through licensure, so too is 
the interface for consumer purchases left to the states 
to design through exchange governance. The ordinary 
American’s experience of purchasing insurance to 
comply with the mandate can therefore be governed 
almost entirely by the states. 
 Furthermore, it is already clear that the states 
will diverge in their exchange designs. See generally 
National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
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Actions to Implement Health Exchanges (Nov. 2011). 
Some states’ exchanges will be non-profit private 
entities; some will be public-private partnerships; 
some will be new states agencies; some will run 
through existing state agencies. Id. Some states’ 
exchanges will work as “active purchasers” of insur-
ance, buying large-group plans on behalf of exchange 
enrollees, while others will work as “open market-
places,” allowing any licensed insurer in the state to 
make its product available through the exchange. Id. 
The ACA thus allows for interstate diversity and 
experimentation in the insurance marketplace, pro-
viding each citizen with an exit opportunity if she 
dislikes her state’s insurance options or exchange 
interface. In short, the ACA leaves significant power 
over health insurance regulation in the hands of the 
smaller subunits of government, allowing citizens to 
retain a strong voice in insurance regulation “without 
having to rely solely upon the political processes that 
control a remote central power.” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 
2364. 
 Admittedly, the ACA sets a federal floor on the 
categories of benefits that must be included in many 
insurance contracts, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a) 
(requiring individual and small-group plans to include 
the “essential health benefits package”); § 18011(a) (ex-
empting grandfathered plans); § 18022(a) (defining 
the “essential health benefits package”), and it sets 
a federal ceiling on the administrative costs (includ-
ing profits) that insurers are allowed to incur, see 
§ 300gg-18(b) (setting a minimum medical-loss ratio 
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of 85% for large-group plans and 80% for individual 
and small-group plans, effectively allowing insurers 
to spend 15-20% of their intake on administration 
and profit). The ACA also establishes new federal 
bans on many once-common insurance practices, in-
cluding caps on annual and lifetime benefits, § 300gg-
11, exclusions for preexisting conditions, § 300gg-3, 
rescissions of plans for reasons other than fraud, 
§ 300gg-12, refusals to issue or renew policies for in-
dividuals, §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-2, 300gg-4(a), and prac-
tices of medical underwriting based on factors other 
than age, tobacco use, and geography, §§ 300gg(a)(1), 
300gg-4(b).  
 These insurance regulations, however, do not 
represent a presumptuous federal takeover of state 
police power. Instead, they represent the culmination 
of many years of state experimentation with insur-
ance reform, which has been necessary to address 
market failures that allow too many sleights of hand 
by insurers at patients’ expense. But many of the 
states’ regulatory attempts have experienced limited 
success because insurance companies can leave the 
states that regulate them in favor of states with laxer 
regimes. See generally Conrad F. Meier, Destroying 
Insurance Markets: How Guaranteed Issue and Com-
munity Rating Destroyed the Individual Health 
Insurance Market in Eight States, Council for Afford-
able Health Insurance passim (2005). In other words, 
the story has been a classic race to the bottom requir-
ing some federal standardization. The ACA accom-
plishes that standardization while preserving state 
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flexibility to innovate and diversify above the federal 
floor. Furthermore, the ACA leaves the states with 
primary enforcement power for all of these regula-
tions, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22, allowing coercive 
regulatory power to remain primarily in state rather 
than federal hands. 
 In short, much of the states’ core police power 
over insurance remains intact after the ACA, includ-
ing the central power of licensure. The ACA puts very 
little coercive regulatory power in federal hands, and 
it preserves opportunities for interstate differentia-
tion in insurance regulation. The ordinary American’s 
experience in complying with the individual mandate, 
thus, will be colored largely by state rather than 
federal regulation, leaving citizens with many oppor-
tunities to influence their health insurance options 
without resort to the “remote central power” of the 
federal government. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
 
B. The ACA Provides States with Political 
and Administrative Avenues to Influ-
ence the ACA’s Development and to In-
novate Beyond the ACA. 
 Of course, while the “political processes that 
control a remote central power,” id., may be entirely 
inaccessible or frustratingly unresponsive from an 
individual voter’s perspective, state governments are 
quite capable of penetrating and influencing those 
processes on their citizens’ behalf. A federal statute 
that provides clear avenues for state participation in 
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the federal regulatory regime is therefore less implic-
ative of a federal police power than a federal statute 
that occupies the regulatory space to the exclusion of 
the states. The ACA provides several such avenues, in 
two broad categories. 
 First and most obviously, the ACA provides for 
“state innovation waivers,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18052, 
empowering the Secretary of Health & Human Ser-
vices (“Secretary”) to excuse individual states from 
most of the ACA’s regulatory requirements, as long as 
the state comes up with a different way to achieve 
comparable results. If the majority of a state’s citi-
zens strongly dislike the individual mandate, then, 
they are not reduced to lobbying Congress for repeal 
of the minimum coverage provision; they can also ask 
their state government to apply for a waiver, replac-
ing the mandate with a more liberty-protective option 
for universal coverage. See generally Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act: Sup-
porting Innovation, Empowering States (Feb. 28, 
2011). A similar waiver scheme has allowed for inter-
state diversity in Medicaid programs, see Frank J. 
Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism 
and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications 
for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. Health Pol. 
Pol’y & L. 971 (2007), indicating that the Secretary’s 
oversight does not stifle states’ ability to represent 
their citizens’ needs and preferences. 
 A second broad feature of the ACA is equally 
important but subtler: By placing primary enforce-
ment power in states’ hands, the ACA gives the states 
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tremendous leverage to influence the everyday ad-
ministration of the ACA’s regulatory scheme. See 
generally Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as 
the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2076 (2008) 
(noting that “responsibility for program implementa-
tion and enforcement appears to enhance state influ-
ence over federal agency decisionmaking”). The point 
here is different from the point above that leaving 
enforcement with the states helps to preserve the core 
of their police power. Here, the idea is that preserving 
state enforcement power forces federal administra-
tors to be responsive to state demands. This aspect of 
state leverage in the federal-state relationship has 
already manifested in a dramatic and surprising way; 
the Department of Health & Human Services re-
cently announced that it will not promulgate federal 
regulations to define the benefits required under the 
broad categories of “essential health benefits” but will 
instead leave that task to the states. Robert Pear, 
Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1. 
 Within the ACA’s regulatory regime, then, the 
states will have many opportunities to shape health-
care and insurance regulation to their citizens’ needs 
and preferences. The Eleventh Circuit’s fear that the 
ACA “forecloses the States from experimenting and 
exercising their own judgment” is therefore entirely 
misplaced. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Although 
the ACA channels some of that experimentation and 
judgment through federal administrative processes, 
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the states retain many opportunities to experiment 
and diversify on their citizens’ behalf. Individuals 
with particular healthcare and health insurance 
needs, thus, will not need to appeal to the “remote 
central power,” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364, for accom-
modation; they will be able to accomplish anything 
they need through state action. In short, even if most 
individuals will comply with the mandate by purchas-
ing a product, the nature and content of that product 
is left largely to state control. 
*    *    * 
 Given the structure of the individual mandate as 
well as the structure of the ACA as a whole, the 
minimum coverage provision presents no threat to in-
dividual liberty nor to the states’ authority to protect 
that liberty. The mandate is merely a standardized 
obligation for all able taxpayers to make a financial 
contribution to the national healthcare infrastruc-
ture. The provision is thus indistinguishable from an 
ordinary tax in terms of its imposition on liberty. 
Furthermore, for those Americans who choose to make 
their mandatory contribution to a private health in-
surer instead of making a shared responsibility 
payment to government, their experience of purchas-
ing insurance will be shaped primarily by state 
rather than federal regulation. If citizens are unhap-
py with the perceived purchase mandate, they will 
have many opportunities to accomplish change through 
their state representatives, “without having to rely 
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solely upon the political processes that control a 
remote central power.” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we urge the Court to 
reverse the Eleventh Circuit and direct entry of 
judgment for the petitioners on the constitutional 
validity of the minimum coverage provision. 
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